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JURISDICTION
This Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this case because the
appeal was not timely filed.

The Commission issued its final

decision on November 20, 1991. (R. 78.) On December 10, 1991, the
Galleria petitioned the Commission for reconsideration of its
order.

(R. 69.) The Commission issued its order on this petition

on March 10, 1992.
April 7, 1992.

(R. 29.)

The Galleria filed its appeal on

(R. 31.)

Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-504 (1992) states:
The action of the Commission on the taxpayer's
Petition for Redetermination of Deficiency
shall be final 30 days after the date of
mailing of the Commission's Notice of Agency
Action. All tax, interest, and penalties are
due 30 days from the date of mailing unless
taxpayer seeks judicial review.
Section 63-46b-14(3)(a) (1989) sets the requirements for judicial
review of final agency action:
A party shall file a Petition for Judicial
Review of Final Agency Action within 30 days
after the date that the order constituting the
final agency action is issued or is considered
to have been issued under Subsection 63-46b13(3)(b).
The order is issued when signed by the Commission.

Dusty's

Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 199 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (1992).
Section 63-46b-13 (1989) allows a party to file a Request for
Reconsideration with the agency "within 20 days after the date that
an order is issued . . . if the order would otherwise constitute
final agency action. . . . "

Under § 63-46b-13(3)(b) an Order

denying a Request for Reconsideration is deemed to be issued 20

days after the filing of the request if no action is taken.
The Galleria filed its Motion for Reconsideration on December
10, 1991.
20 days.

(R. 69.)

No action was taken by the Commission within

Therefore, pursuant to § 63-46b-13(3)(b), an Order was

deemed to have issued denying the motion on December 30, 1991.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a) (1989), Petitioner
"shall file a Petition for Judicial Review within 30 days after the
date the Order . . .

is considered to have been issued under

Subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b)."

The Galleria would have had to

appeal the Order that was deemed to have issued by January 29,
1992.

It did not file until April 7, 1992. (R. 31.) Accordingly,

the appeal was untimely and the Court lacks jurisdiction.
The provisions of § 63-46b-13(3) (b) are tied to the provisions
of

§

63-46b-14(3) (a) in order to insure that a Motion

for

Reconsideration cannot indefinitely delay the time for filing an
appeal. The Court should therefore strictly enforce the time limit
set forth therein.

ISSUES
I. Whether the Court Should Issue an Advisory Opinion on the
Future Taxability of the Galleria's Roller Rink and Batting Cages
and on Alleged Federal Equal Protection Clause and Due Process
Clause Violations Involving Them, Where the Commission Imposed No
Liability on These Items for the Audit Period that is Now before
the Court?
2

Standard of Review:

(Not applicable.)

II. Whether the Commission Properly Found that the Galleria's
Batting Cages, Laser Tag, and Roller Skating are "Admissions" for
Sales Tax Where Each Involve Entrance to an Enclosed Area.
Standard of Review;

Under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d)

(1989) this Court can grant relief to Appellant if the agency has
erroneously interpreted or applied the law.

This issue is a

question of law and is therefore reviewed under a correction of
error

standard

interpretation.

with

no

deference

given

to

the

agency's

Morton Int'l v. Auditing Div. State Tax Comm'n,

814 P.2d 581, 588-89 (Utah 1991).
III.

Whether There is a Rational Basis for the Commission's

Ruling that the Galleria's Roller Rink, Laser Tag, and Batting
Cages are Subject to Sales Tax for Admissions When the Commission's
Rational for Admissions is the Same as that From the Supreme Court
of Another State?
Standard of Review;

This issue is a question of law and is

reviewed under a correction of error standard with no deference
given to the agency's interpretation.

Morton Int'l v. Auditing

Div. State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 588-89 (Utah 1991).

DETERMINATIVE LAW
Appendix 1.
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-504 (1992).

2.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a) (1989).
3

3.

Utah Code Ann.

§ 63-46b-13(3) (1989).

4.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1)(f) (1992).

5.

Utah Code Admin. P. R865-19-33S.

6.

Utah Code Admin. P. R865-19-34S.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a decision of the Tax Commission
denying a Petition for Redetermination of sales tax.

On February

21, 1990, the Galleria was assessed sales tax on admissions to
batting cages, laser tag and roller skating.

(R. 72, 190-191.)

The Galleria filed a petition for redetermination of these taxes,
and requested that the Commission abate all tax, interest and
penalties. (R. 187.)

On November 20, 1991, the Commission found

the taxes should be imposed on these admissions, but made its
ruling prospective only for the batting cages and roller skating.
(R. 77.) The Galleria was liable for payment of tax on laser game
receipts.

(Id.) On December 10, 1991, the Galleria petitioned for

reconsideration of that decision, but was denied relief on March
10, 1992.

(R. 69, 29.) A subsequent motion to stay the order was

denied (1, 33.)
Supreme

Court

An untimely writ of review was filed with the

on April

7, 1992.

(R. 31.)

subsequently reassigned to the Court of Appeals.

4

The

case was

FACTS
In February

1990, the Galleria was assessed

penalty, and interest.

sales tax,

(R. 190-191, 17). The tax was for sales

made, among other things, on admissions to the Galleria's batting
cages, laser tag, and roller skating rink.

(R.73).

The Galleria

filed a petition for redetermination of the taxes, specifically
asking

"that the Tax Commission determine

that there is no

deficiency for sales tax for the Audit Period July 1, 1986 through
June 30, 1989, and that the Tax Commission abate all taxes,
interest and penalties assessed in the statutory notice."

(R.

187. )
The batting cages are individual boxes, divided by chain link
that encloses balls hit by the entrant; they also act as a
backstop.

(R. 143).x

The batting machine throws a specified

number of pitches at difficultly levels and speeds selected by the
batter.

(Id.-)

The batter can either reserve the batting cage

through a control counter or it can be coin activated to start a
timer.

(R. 144.)

The record contains few descriptive details about laser tag
other than it is similar to the batting cages.

(R. 144.)

"Upon

payment of a cash fee, customers were provided laser guns and
sensing devices and engaged in mock combat in an enclosed area."

1

The parties below appear to have tried the case on facts
"generally known" about the Galleria and what was on file with the
Commission. (Tr. 34, 44.)
5

(R. 144.)
Galleria.

Laser tag has subsequently been discontinued by the
(R. 73.)

The roller skating activities allow a

participant to "skate for a period of time upon payment of cash."
(R.184. )
Prior to the audit, the Galleria had requested advice on the
taxability of the batting cages and roller rink.

(R. 76.)

It

received conflicting advise from auditors in the Auditing Division.
(R. 73.) No advice was sought on the taxability of laser tag. (R.
77. )
At a formal hearing before the Tax Commission, counsel for the
Galleria argued that if it had a clear determination on the duty to
impose sales tax on its admissions, for the future, it would
collect the tax and pass its cost on to the consumer.

(Tr. 33.)

The Commission found that tax should be imposed on these
admissions, but because of "the unusual circumstances of this
case," where the Galleria had received conflicting information from
the

Auditing

Division,

it

would

"not

apply

the

retroactively to the transactions in questions."

sales

(R. 77.)

tax
It

reasoned that because the Galleria could not "recoup the tax from
its customers, who were originally responsible for payment . . .
receipts from its batting cages and roller skating rink are not
subject to sales tax for the period of the audit.

However,

Petitioner did not rely on Commission advice in failing to collect
sales tax on laser game receipts.

The Petitioner is therefore

liable for payment of tax on those receipts."
6

(R. 77) (emphasis

added.)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
As set forth in the Statement of Jurisdiction, the Galleria's
appeal was untimely.

The Court lacks jurisdiction to hear it.

The relief sought by the Galleria below was that no sales tax
be imposed on its batting cages, roller rink, or laser tag for the
audit period.

This relief was granted for the batting cages and

roller rink. The requested relief sought by the Galleria on appeal
cannot effect its rights on these issues because they were decided
so as to avoid harm to the Galleria. Accordingly, the Court should
refuse an advisory opinion on the future taxability of these items.
If the Court decides to address the taxability of the batting
cages and roller skating, the plain language of the statute
sustains the imposition of sales tax on these items as well as the
Galleria's laser tag.

The Court should examine what general

purpose the 1933 legislature had when the statute was enacted to
determine the statutes intended scope.

Evidence of the enacting

legislature's purpose is the broad language used in the statutory
phrase, "admission to any place of amusement, entertainment or
recreation."

This broad statement of legislative purpose using

generic terms is evidence that the enacting legislature intended
that unmentioned transactions are subject to taxation. The statute
includes the phrase "including seats and tables" as a phrase of
enlargement. If the Court interprets it as a phrase of limitation,
7

it must ignore other portions of the statute. Such a construction
was not intended by the enacting legislature.
Taxation of the Galleria's roller rink, laser tag, and batting
cages, and not

its bowling

definition of admission.

facility, is rational

under the

Admission means entering a place, not

participation in an activity. The Commission's application of the
statute is consistent with this definition.

Accordingly, the

Commission's application of the statute is rationally related to
its intended purpose.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT SHOULD REFUSE AN ADVISORY OPINION ON THE FUTURE
TAXABILITY OF THE GALLERIA'S ROLLER RINK AND BATTING
CAGES AND ON ALLEGED EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE AND DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE VIOLATIONS INVOLVING THEM.

The relief sought by the Galleria below was that no sales tax
be imposed on the batting cages, roller rink, and laser tag for the
audit period.2

(R. 187.) This relief was granted for the batting

cages and roller rink.

(R. 77.)

"[W]hen the requested relief

cannot affect the rights of the litigants" a case is moot.

Salt

Lake v. Tax Comm'n, 813 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Utah 1991) (amendment of
statute while case is pending on appeal moots the appeal; quoting
Burkett v. Schwendiman, 773 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 1989)).
to a "longstanding

This is due

judicial policy in Utah to avoid advisory

2

As set forth in the Statement of Jurisdiction, the Galleria
did not bring its appeal in a timely manner. Therefore, the Court
lacks jurisdiction.
8

opinions," the court will "not generally consider mooted questions
on appeal,"

Reynolds v. Reynolds, 788 P.2d 1044, 1045 (Utah Ct.

App. 1990).

The Court should remand these issues and order their

dismissal. Merhish v. H. A. Folsom & Associates, 646 P.2d 731, 733
(Utah 1982).

The relief sought on these issues on appeal cannot

affect the rights of the Galleria because only the contested audit
period is before the Court.3
Likewise, the Intervenor argues that the Auditing Division has
incorrectly treated its batting cages and roller rink differently
than other amusements, and has violated the Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses of the Federal Constitution.
Brief at 9-16)

(See Intervenor's

Even if this treatment were unjustified, which it

was not, the Commission abated all tax on these items.
The Galleria suffered no harm.

(R. 77.)

Accordingly, the Court need not

address these issues.
II.

THE COURT SHOULD LOOK AT THE ENACTING LEGISLATURE'S
PURPOSEf AS EVIDENCED BY THE BROAD TERMS IT USED IN
DEFINING "ADMISSION, " TO SUSTAIN IMPOSITION OF SALES TAX
ON THE GALLERIA'S LASER TAG, ROLLER RINK, AND BATTING
CAGES.
A.

When Interpreting an Older Statute , the Court
Should Examine What General Purpose The Legislature
Had When the Statute was Enacted.

If the Court decides to address the issues of the Galleria's
batting cages and Roller Rink, the plain language of the statutory
3

This issue is ripe for future periods unaffected by this
appeal. See Adelman v. Adelman, 815 P.2d 741, 744 (Utah Ct. App.
1991) ("actual or imminent clash of legal right and obligations"
makes case ripe for adjudication).

9

definition of "admission" makes the Galleria's batting cage, roller
rink, and laser tag subject to sales tax. See Utah Code Ann. § 5912-103(1)(f) (1992).A

In beginning its analysis, the Court should

recall that:
[T]axing statutes should generally be construed favorable
to the taxpayer and strictly against the taxing authority
. . . Notwithstanding the foregoing, there is also to be
considered the over-arching principle, applicable to all
statutes, that they should be construed and applied in
accordance with the intent of the Legislature and the
purpose sought to be accomplished.
Parson Asphalt Products v. Tax Comm'n, 617 P.2d 397, 398 (Utah
1980) (footnote omitted).
The

statute

was

enacted

in

1933; no

legislative intent, except the statute itself.

record

exists

of

The Court should

examine what purpose the legislature had when the statute was
enacted.

One noted commentator has explained:

[A]s a statute gains in age—its language is called upon
to deal with circumstances utterly uncontemplated at the
time of its passage. Here the quest is not properly for
the sense originally intended by the statute, for the
sense sought originally to be put into it, but rather for
the sense which can be quarried out of it in the light of
the new situation. Broad purposes can indeed reach far
beyond details known or knowable at the time of drafting.
A "dangerous weapon" statute of 1840 can include tommy
guns, tear gas or atomic bombs. "Vehicle," in a statute
of 1840, can properly be read, when sense so suggests, to
include an automobile, or a hydroplane that lacks wheels.
A

The statute, prior to its amendment, effective March b,
1987, provided for taxation "of the amount paid for admission to
any place of amusement, entertainment, or recreation." Utah Code
Ann. § 59-15-4(l)(d) (Supp. 1986); Laws of Utah Ch. 5 § 23 (1987).
It defined admission. Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-2(9). The changes
effective March 6, 1987 appear to make only technical changes.
(See disc containing January 28, 1987 floor debate.)
10

But for all that, the sound quest does not run primarily
in terms of historical intent. It runs in terms of what
the words can be made to bear, in making sense in the
light of the unforeseen.
Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and
the Rules or Canons about How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 Vand.
L. Rev. 395 (1950) (printed in extracted form in Sutherland,
Statutory Construction, Vol 2A 539, 541 (5th ed.)).

Accordingly,

the Court should look at the legislature's purpose to determine if
that purpose fits the taxation of the Galleria's amusements.
B.

Evidence of the Enacting Legislature's Purpose Is
Contained In the Broad Language Used in the
Statutory Phrase "Admission to Any Place of
Amusement, Entertainment, or Recreation."

The statutory definition of "admission" provides:
(1) There is levied a tax on the purchaser
for the amount paid or charged for the
following:
. . . .

(f)
admission to any place of amusement,
entertainment, or recreation, including seats
and tables reserved or otherwise, and other
similar accommodations;
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103 (1992).
The

phrase

"admission

to

any

entertainment, or recreation" is broad.

place

of

amusement,

The word admission means

"the 'price of entrance;' the change for 'permission or right to
enter' a place." Grauer v. Director of Revenue, 396 P.2d 260, 264
(Kan. 1964)(quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary).
The word "any" refers to all places of amusement, entertainment, or
recreation.

It cannot be construed as a term of limitation.
11

See

Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. v. Central Wever Sewer Improvement
Dist. , 287 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1955) ("To argue that 'any taxpayer'
means only "real property owner" is to blind oneself to the words
and realities. . . .")
recreation"
transaction.

are

The words "amusement, entertainment, or

generic, and

do not

refer

to

any

specific

This broad statement of legislative purpose using

generic terms is evidence that the enacting legislature intended
that

unmentioned

transactions

are

subject

to

taxation.

Accordingly, these activities fall within the statutory meaning of
admission.
C.

The Word "Including" Is a Term of Enlargement That
Evidences The Legislative Purpose of Including
Seats and Tables in the Statutory Category of
"Admission."

The tax is levied on "admissions."

This means:

(f)
admission to any place of amusement,
entertainment, or recreation, including seats
and tables reserved or otherwise, and other
similar accommodations;
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1)(f) (1992).

"The term 'including' as

a word of enlargement, implies that something else has been given
beyond the general language which precedes it; that it adds to the
general clause a species which does not naturally belong to it;
that it is the equivalent of "also." Albertson's, Inc. v. Hansen,
600 P.2d 982, 990 (Utah 1979) (Maughan, J., dissenting.) Although
the preceding definition comes from a dissenting opinion, it is
consistent with the existing, more antiquated, Utah case law
examining this question.
12

The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Montello Salt Co., 98 P.
549 (Utah 1908), rev'd, 221 U.S. 452 (1911), in interpreting a
federal law, likewise determined that the term "including" was a
term of enlargement.

In drawing this conclusion, the court looked

at what it believed to be the intent of the enacting legislature,
98 P. at 551. The court's decision was later overturned after the
U.S.

Supreme

Court

legislative intent.

disagreed

with

this

interpretation

of

The legal principle from these cases is that

the term "including" is generally a term of enlargement, but may
not be if that is the legislative intent.
In this case, to conclude that the term "including" is a term
of limitation would require the Court to violate a fundamental
principle of statutory interpretation that requires, if possible,
that every word of a statute be given effect. Madsen v. Borthick,
769 P.2d 245, 252 n.ll (Utah 1988).

If tax must be collected for

admission only to places "including seats and tables reserved or
otherwise," the larger part of the statute must be ignored.
(Intervener's Brief at 6-8.)

The phrase "any place of amusement,

entertainment, or recreation" would become surplusage. Likewise,
the

phrase

meaningless.

"and

other

similar

accommodations"

would

become

Certainly, this was unintended by the enacting

legislature.

13

III. TAXATION OF THE GALLERIA'S ROLLER RINKf LASER TAGf AND
BATTING CAGES, AND NOT ITS BOWLING FACILITY, IS RATIONAL
UNDER THE DEFINITION OF "ADMISSION."
The Intervenor states that the Commission's application of the
statute must be supported by a rational basis or it violates
federal equal protection and due process standards.5 (Intervener's
Brief at 9-16.)

The Commission's application of the statute is

consistent with the terms used by the legislature.

One of the

Commission's rules, interpreting admission, provides, in part,
"Admission" means the right or privilege to enter into a place. .
. ." Utah Code Admin. P. R865-19-33S (emphasis added).

The other

rule interpreting "place of amusement, entertainment or recreation"
provides that they are "broad in meaning, but convey[] the basic
idea of a definite location, even though such charge includes the
right of the purchaser to participate in some activity within the
place. . . . " Id. at R865-19-34S (emphasis added).

In this case,

the Commission held that admissions to both the batting cage and
laser tag were taxable because they occurred within an "enclosed
area."6

(R. 76) (emphasis added).

The Commission found roller

These issues were never expressly petitioned below. See
Amended Petition for Redetermination.
(R. 183-187.)
Some
references were made to vagueness below; however, never within the
express theoretical context argued by the Intervenor for the first
time on appeal. See e.g. (R. 66, 124) (vagueness); see also (R.
117)(due process).
6

These rules and the Commission's decision, not statements
made by the auditors or Attorney General's Office, (R. 28),
represent the policies of the Commission. See Morton Int'l v.
Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 581, 595 (Utah 1991).
The Galleria
conceded below that a draft letter from the Attorney General's
14

skating

taxable because

administrative rule.

it was

(R. 75-76.)

specifically mentioned

in an

Accordingly, the Commission's

rules and decision rest upon paid entrance into a specific place.
The Kansas Supreme Court in Grauer v. Director of Revenue, 396
P. 2d 260 (Kan. 1964) interpreted a statute similar to Utah's
statute.

At issue in Grauer was whether bowling was subject to a

sales tax for admissions.

The court reasoned:

[W]hat the legislature taxed . . . was the
price of admission to enter a place of
amusement, entertainment or recreation. Had
the legislature by its enactment intended to
impose a tax on charges for participation in
such activities as bowling, it could have
easily done so. The fact that it did not do
so is persuasive that it was not the intention
of the legislature to impose a tax on charges
made
for
participation
in
recreation
activities.
396 P. 2d at 264. Accordingly, the court found that admission means
the price of entering a place, not participation in an activity.
Thus, the Commission's interpretation of the statute, and the
statutory term "admission" are consistent.
The Intervenor has argued that the terms of the statute
require a broader application.

(Intervener's Brief at 10.) They

have argued that certain untaxed activities are subject to tax.
(Intervener's Brief at 10-11.) Those activities are not before the

Office was submitted for argument only, not as evidence. (Tr.
p. 21.) Finally, there may be some confusion as to the duties of an
office auditor. (See Intervenor's Brief at 3.)("0ffice auditor of
the Tax Commission.") An office auditor has no policy making
responsibilities. (R. 179.)
15

Court in this case, with the exception of bowling; no advisory
opinion should be given on them.

If the Intervener's argument is

accepted, the Court should remand the case back to the Commission
ordering it to impose tax on Galleria activities that fall within
the Intervener's broad definition of "admission."

CONCLUSION
The Court should find that the appeal was untimely as set
forth in the Statement of Jurisdiction.

If it does not, the

Commission granted much of the relief sought by the Galleria. The
Court should refuse an advisory opinion on issues that do not
affect the Galleria's rights during the audit period. The Court
should examine the broad definition of "admission" as set forth in
the statutes plain language to conclude that entrance into a
batting cage, laser tag area, or roller rink fall within the
enacting legislature's purpose.

Finally, the Court should rule

that taxation of the Galleria's roller rink, laser tax, and batting
cages, and

not

its bowling

facility, is rational

under the

legislatures definition of admission. For these reasons, the Court
should sustain the Commission's decision.
DATED this

IJ -— day of March, 1993.

C.?V|%C
JOHN C. McCARREY
Assistant Attorney General
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APPENDIX 1

GENERAL TAXATION POLICIES

M

ning the identity and other
le tax returns or to pay any
t least three years and then
y of a class A misdemeanor.
, he shall be dismissed from
3 in this state for a period of
tax.
"class B" in the first sentence in
5).
ferences. — Sentencing for misde76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301.

< Comm'n, 813 P.2d 1174 (Utah
» disclosure in Subsection (1) canbly be read to negate the express
for disclosure contained in Sub*nd incorporated into the adhesion
t the commission requires all local
*ign if they want to enact a local
s tax. Salt Lake City v. Tax
.3 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1991).
Millard County v. State Tax
Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (1991).
ES

59-1-505

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Key Numbers. — Taxation «=» 451 et seq.,
1085.

59-1-502.

Repealed.

Repeals. — Laws 1987, ch. 161, § 314 repeals § 59-1-502, as amended by Laws 1987,
ch. 149, § 1, relating to determinations by the

commission, hearings, procedures, standards,
and the barring of petitions for refund, effective January 1, 1988.

59-1-503. Assessment and payment of amount determined.
(1) Following a redetermination of a deficiency by the commission, the entire amount redetermined as the deficiency by the decision of the commission,
which has become final, shall be assessed and shall be paid within 30 days
from the date of mailing of the notice and demand from the commission.
(2) If the taxpayer does not file a petition with the commission within the
time prescribed for filing the petition, the deficiency, notice of which has been
mailed to the taxpayer shall be assessed, and shall be paid within 30 days
from the date of mailing of the notice and demand from the commission.
History: C. 1953, 59-30-3, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 283, § 8; renumbered by L. 1987,
ch. 3, § 47; 1987, ch. 161, § 212; 1991, ch. 51,
§ 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted

"within 30 days from the date of mailing of the
notice" for "within ten days after notice" near
the end of Subsections (1) and (2), and deleted
former Subsection (3), concerning the commencement date of the former ten-day period.

59-1-504. Time determination final.
The action of the commission on the taxpayer's petition for redetermination
of deficiency shall be final 30 days after the date of mailing of the commission's notice of agency action. All tax, interest, and penalties are due 30 days
from the date of mailing, unless the taxpayer seeks judicial review.
History: C. 1953, 59-30-4, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 283, § 8; renumbered by L. 1987,
ch. 3, § 48; 1987, ch. 161, § 213.

vtlNATION OF
59-1-505. Deposit of amount due prerequisite to appeal.
determination of a decion, petitioning the commis-

A taxpayer who, after receiving a final decision from the commission in
accordance with the other provisions of this part, desires to seek judicial
review of that decision shall deposit the full amount of the taxes, interest, and
penalties with the commission.
History: C. 1953, 59-30-5, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 283, § 8; renumbered by L. 1987,
ch. 3, § 49; 1987, ch. 161, § 214.
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63-46b-13

STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL

(vii) a notice of any right of further administrative reconsideration
or judicial review available to aggrieved parties; and
(viii) the time limits applicable to any appeal or review.
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-12, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 268; 1988, ch. 72, § 22.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, designated the
former introductory paragraph in Subsection
(1) as present Subsection (l)(a), substituting
"30 days" for "ten days" in that paragraph, and
redesignated former Subsections (l)(a) to (d) as

present Subsections (l)(b)(i) to (iv); inserted "or
within the time period provided by agency
rule, whichever is longer" in Subsection (2);
and made minor stylistic changes,
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161,
§ 3 1 5 m a k e s t h e a c t effective on January 1,
jggg

63-46b-13. Agency review — Reconsideration.
(1) (a) Within 20 days after the date that an order is issued for which
review by the agency or by a superior agency under Section 63-46b-12 is
unavailable, and if the order would otherwise constitute final agency
action, any party may file a written request for reconsideration with the
agency, stating the specific grounds upon which relief is requested.
(b) Unless otherwise provided by statute, the filing of the request is not
a prerequisite for seeking judicial review of the order.
(2) The request for reconsideration shall be filed with the agency and one
copy shall be sent by mail to each party by the person making the request.
(3) (a) The agency head, or a person designated for that purpose, shall issue
a written order granting the request or denying the request.
(b) If the agency head or the person designated for that purpose does
not issue an order within 20 days after the filing of the request, the
request for reconsideration shall be considered to be denied.
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-13, enacted by L. stating the specific grounds upon which relief
1987, ch. 161, § 269; 1988, ch. 72, § 23.
i8 requested"; deleted "or the order on review"
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- a t t n e e n d in Subsection (1Kb); and substituted
ment, effective April 25 1988 subdivided Sub- "reconsideration" for "rehearing" in Subsection
section (1) and rewrote Subsection (l)(a), which (QVK)
had read "Within ten days after the date that
J,'* ..
_. .
._„_ , . „.
T
an order on review is issued, or within ten days . 3Effective
Dates. - Laws 1987, ch. 161,
15 makes the act
after the date that a final order is issued for §
effective on January 1,
which agency review is unavailable, any party 1988.
may file a written request for reconsideration

63-46b-14. Judicial review — Exhaustion of administrative remedies.
( D A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action,
except in actions where judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute.
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative remedies available, except that:
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust administrative
remedies if this chapter or any other statute states that exhaustion is not
required;
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the requirement to exhaust any or all administrative remedies if:
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or
734
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(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm disproportionate to the public benefit derived from requiring exhaustion.
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action
within 30 days after the date that the order constituting the final agency
action is issued or is considered to have been issued under Subsection
63-46b-13(3)(b).
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all other appropriate parties as respondents and shall meet the form requirements specified in this
chapter.
History: C. 1953,63-46b-14, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 270; 1988, ch. 72, § 24.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, divided former
Subsection (1) into present Subsections (1) and
(2) and redesignated former Subsection (2) as
present Subsection (3); added "or is considered

to have been issued under Subsection
63-46b-13(3)(b)M in Subsection (3); and made
minor stylistic changes,
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161,
§ 315 m a kes the act effective on January 1,
1988.

63-46b-15. Judicial review — Informal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) (a) The district courts shall have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo
all final agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings.
(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings shall
be as provided in the statute governing the agency or, in the absence of
such a venue provision, in the county where the petitioner resides or
maintains his principal place of business.
(2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings
shall be a complaint governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
shall include:
(i) the name and mailing address of the party seeking judicial review;
(ii) the name and mailing address of the respondent agency;
(iii) the title and date of the final agency action to be reviewed,
together with a duplicate copy, summary, or brief description of the
agency action;
(iv) identification of the persons who were parties in the informal
adjudicative proceedings that led to the agency action;
(v) a copy of the written agency order from the informal proceeding;
(vi) facts demonstrating that the party seeking judicial review is
entitled to obtain judicial review;
(vii) a request for relief, specifying the type and extent of relief
requested;
(viii) a statement of the reasons why the petitioner is entitled to
relief,
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in the district court are
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall determine all questions of
fact and law and any constitutional issue presented in the pleadings.
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59-12-103

SALES AND USE TAX ACT

REVENUE AND TAXATION

deemed wholesale purchases and exempt from
the sales tax. Barrett Inv. Co. v. State Tax
Comra., 15 Utah 2d 97, 387 P.2d 998 (1964).

59-12-103, Sales and use tax base — Rate.
~)f(l) There is levied a tax on the purchaser for the amount paid or charged for
the following:
(a) retail sales of tangible personal property made within the state;
(b) amount paid to common carriers or to telephone or telegraph corporations, whether the corporations are municipally or privately owned, for:
(i) all transportation;
(ii) intrastate telephone service; or
(iii) telegraph service;
(c) gas, electricity, heat, coal, fuel oil, or other fuels sold or furnished
for commercial consumption;
(d) gas, electricity, heat, coal, fuel oil, or other fuels sold or furnished
for residential use;
(e) meals sold;
^f"(f) admission to any place of amusement, entertainment, or recreation,
including seats and tables reserved or otherwise, and other similar accommodations;
(g) services for repairs or renovations of tangible personal property or
services to install tangible personal property in connection with other
tangible personal property;
(h) cleaning or washing of tangible personal property;
(i) tourist home, hotel, motel, or trailer court accommodations and services for less than 30 consecutive days;
(j) laundry and dry cleaning services;
(k) leases and rentals of tangible personal property if the property situs
is in this state, if the lessee took possession in this state, or if the property
is stored, used, or otherwise consumed in this state; and
(1) tangible personal property stored, used, or consumed in this state.
(2) Except for Subsection (l)(d), the rates of the tax levied under Subsection
(1) shall be:
(a) 53/32% through December 31, 1989; and
(b) 5% from and after January 1, 1990.
(3) The rates of the tax levied under Subsection (l)(d) shall be:
(a) 23/32% through December 31, 1989; and
(b) 2% from and after January 1, 1990!
(4) (a) From January 1, 1990, through December 31, 1999, there shall be
deposited in an Olympics special revenue fund or funds as determined by
the Division of Finance under Section 51-5-4, for the use of the Utah
Sports Authority created under Title 9, Chapter 1, Part 3, Utah Sports
Authority Act:
(i) the amount of sales and use tax generated by a 1IM% tax rate on
the taxable items and services under Subsection (1);
(ii) the amount of revenue generated by a X/M% tax rate under
Section 59-12-204 on the taxable items and services under Subsection
(1); and
(iii) interest earned on the amounts under Subsections (i) and (ii).
(b) These funds shall be used by the Utah Sports Authority as follows:
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(i) to the extent funds are available, to transfer directly to a debt
service fund or to otherwise reimburse to the state of Utah any
amount expended on debt service or any other cost of any bonds
issued by the state to construct any public sports facility as defined in
Section 9-1-303; and
(ii) to pay for the actual and necessary operating, administrative,
legal, and other expenses of the Utah Sports Authority, but not including protocol expenses for seeking and obtaining the right to host
the Winter Olympic Games.
History: L. 1933, ch. 63, § 2; 1933 (2nd1 March 9, 1990, rewrote Subsection (4)(a)(i),
which had read "the amount of sales and use
S.S.), ch. 20, § 1; 1935, ch. 91, § 1; 1937, ch.
tax generated by 1/64% of the tax levied under
110, & 1; 1939, ch. 103, § 1; C. 1943, 80-15-2;;
Subsection (2Kb) and 1/64% of the tax levied
L. 1943, ch. 92, § 1; 1949, ch. 83, § 1; 1957,,
under Subsection (3)(b)" and Subsection
ch. 125, § 1; 1963, ch. 140, $ 1; 1969, ch. 187,,
(4)(a)(ii), which had read "the amount of reve§ 1; 1969 (1st S.S.), ch. 14, § 1; 1971, ch. 152,,
;
§ 1; 1973, ch. 151, 5 1; 1981, ch. 239, § 1; nue generated by 1/64% of the local option tax
as provided in Subsection 59-12-205(4)," and
1986, ch. 55, 5 2; C. 1953, 59-15-2; renuminserted "administrative, legal" in Subsection
bered by L. 1987, ch. 5, § 21; 1989, ch. 41,,
§ 6; 1989 (2nd S.S.), ch. 5, § 5; 1990, ch. 22,i, (4)(b)(ii).
The 1990 amendment by ch. 22, effective
§ 1; 1990, ch. 171, § 1; 1991, ch. 152, § 1;;
July 1, 1990, subdivided Subsection (1Kb); de1992, ch. 241, § 370.
leted "as defined by Section 54-2-1" after "teleAmendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, 1989, substituted1 graph corporations" in paragraph of Subsection
(1Kb); and added "intrastate" at the beginning
"5l/64%" for " 5 % " in Subsection (2Kb); substituted "2l/64%" for "2%" in Subsection (3)(b); and1 of Subsection (l)(b)(ii).
The 1991 amendment, effective April 29,
added Subsection (4).
The 1989 (2nd S.S.) amendment, effectivee 1991, inserted "Utah Sports Authority Act" in
October 10,1989, substituted "5%" for "5 »/64%" Subsection (4)(a), and added Subsection
in Subsection (2Kb); substituted "2%" for "22 (4)(a)(iii).
The 1992 amendment, effective March 13,
VB4%" in Subsection (3)(b); subdivided Subsec1992, substituted the reference to Title 9,
tion (4) and rewrote the introductory languagee
of Subsection (4)(a), which read: "For fiscal1 Chapter 1, Part 3 for a reference to Title 62,
year beginning July 1, 1990, there is appropri- Chapter 1 in Subsection (4)(a) and the reference to § 9-1-303 for a reference to § 62-1-102
ated to the entity created under Subsectioni
in Subsection (4)(b)(l).
11-13-5.5(4)"; substituted "VM%" for " l / 32 %" ini
Cross-References. — County or municipal
two places in Subsection (4)(a)(i); and added1
sales and use tax, provisions of ordinance,
Subsections (4)(a)(ii) and (4)(b)(i) and (ii).
The 1990 amendment by ch. 171, effective3 § 59-12-204.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Amusement admissions.
Construction.
Definitions.
Dental materials purchased by practitioners.
Exemption from tax.
Fractional sales.
Fuel oil used by railroad.
Industrial coal.
Items furnished by motel to guests.
Laundry service.
Liability of consumer for tax.
Municipally owned electric plants.
Natural gas pipeline.
Private clubs.

Purchase of coal.
Purchase price.
Railroad services.
Rare and foreign coins.
Repair sales.
Sale in sister state.
Sales of artificial limbs.
Tourist accommodations and services.
Transportation.
Valuation of trade-ins.
Vendor's duty to collect tax.
Constitutionality.
Subsections (l)(c) and (l)(d) have been held
to be constitutional against various contentions. State Tax Comm. v. City of Logan, 88
Utah 406, 54 P.2d 1197 (1936).
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R865-19-33S

Tax Commission

property for no additional consideration or nominal
additional consideration upon compliance with the
lease agreement. Nominal consideration in this sense
means ten percent or less of the original lease amount.
G If the lessee treats a conditional sale lease as a
sale, and if the lessor is also the vendor of the property,
the sales price for sales tax purposes must be at least
equal to the average sales price of similar property.
H. If the lessee treats a conditional sale lease as a
sale, the sales tax must be collected by the lessor on the
full purchase price of the property at the time of the
purchase.

R865-19-33S. A d m i s s i o n Defined P u r s u a n t to
U t a h C o d e Ann. S e c t i o n 59-12-103.
A. "Admission" means the right or privilege to enter
into a place. Admission includes the amount paid for
the right to use a reserved seat or any seat in an auditorium, theater, circus, stadium, schoolhouse, meeting
house, or gymnasium to view any type of entertainment. Admission also includes the right to use a table
at a night club, hotel, or roof garden whether such
charge is designated as a cover charge, minimum
charge, or any such similar charge.
1. This applies whether the charge made for the use
of the seat, table, or similar accommodation is combined with an admission charge to form a single charge,
or is separate and distinct from an admission charge, or
is the sole charge.
B. If the original admission charge carries the right to
remain in a place, or to use a seat or table, or other similar accommodation for a limited time only, and an additional charge is made for an extension of such time, the
extra charge is paid for admission within the meaning
of the law. Where a person or organization acquires the
sole right to use any place or the right to dispose of all
of the admissions to any place for one or more occasions,
the amount paid is not subject to the tax on admissions.
Such a transaction constitutes a rental of the entire
place and if the person or organization in turn sells
admissions, sales tax applies to amounts paid for such
admissions.
R865-19-34S. A d m i s s i o n t o P l a c e s of A m u s e m e n t
P u r s u a n t t o U t a h C o d e A n n . S e c t i o n 59-12-103.
A. The phrase "place of amusement, entertainment,
or recreation" is broad in meaning but conveys the basic
idea of a definite location.
B. The amount paid for admission to such a place is
subject to the tax, even though such charge includes the
right of the purchaser to participate in some activity
within the place. For example, the sale of a ticket for a
ride upon a mechanical or self-operated device is an
admission to a place of amusement.
C Charges for admissions to swimming pools, skating
rinks, and other places of amusement are subject to tax.
Charges for towel rentals, swimming suit rentals, skate
rentals, etc , are also subject to tax. Locker rental fees
are subject to sales tax if the lockers are tangible personal property.
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R865-19-35S. R e s i d e n t i a l o r C o m m e r c i a l U s e of
Gas, Electricity, Heat, Coal, F u e l Oils o r Other
F u e l s P u r s u a n t to U t a h C o d e A n n . S e c t i o n 5912-103.
A. "Commercial consumption" is a s denned in 59-12102(1).
B. "Noncommercial consumption" is denned as fuel
used in:
1. mining or extraction of minerals;
2. off highway agriculture, including commercial
greenhouses, irrigation pumps, farm machinery, and
other farming activities to produce the agricultural
product up to the time of harvest or placing products
into storage facilities; and
3. use in manufacturing tangible personal property or
use in producing or compounding of a product which
will be resold.
C. All activities not specifically defined as noncommercial or residential consumption are considered as
commercial consumption.
D. "Other fuels" means products which burn independently to produce heat or energy.
1. Explosives or material used as active ingredients in
explosive devices are not fuels.
E. If a firm h a s activities which a r e commercial and
noncommercial and all fuels are furnished at given
locations through single meters, t h e predominant use
of the fuels shall determine taxable s t a t u s of the fuels.
R865-19-36S. Street R a i l w a y a n d Other Fares
P u r s u a n t to U t a h Code Ann. S e c t i o n 59-12-103.
A. "Street railway fare" means an amount paid to a
street railway or bus, or an extension thereof, by whatsoever power operated, for passenger transportation
service rendered over a line operating mainly upon,
along, above, or below any street, avenue, road, highway, bridge, or public place within any city or town.
1. The term does not include a railway or bus used as
p a r t of a commercial or interurban system.
B. All fares paid for intrastate transportation of persons to common carriers having established routes are
subject to tax, except:
1. street railways fares,
2. amounts paid for chartered transportation rendering service only to specific parties with whom a contract
has been made, and
3. amounts paid for persons traveling in air commerce.
R865-19-37S. E x e m p t S a l e s P u r s u a n t to Utah
Code Ann. S e c t i o n 59-12-104.
A Definitions.
1. "Commercials," "audio tapes," and "video tapes"
mean tapes, films, or discs used by television or radio
stations in regular broadcasting activities but do not
include blank tapes purchased for newscasts and similar uses by radio and television stations.
2. "Motion picture exhibitor" m e a n s any person
engaged in the business of operating a theater or establishment in which motion pictures a r e regularly exhibited to the public for a charge.
3. "Distributor" means persons who purchase or sell
motion picture films and video tapes which are used by
a commercial television broadcaster or a motion picture
exhibitor.
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APPENDIX 2

BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION
THE 49TH STREET GALLERIA,
Petitioner,
v.
AUDITING DIVISION OF THE
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND FINAL DECISION
Appeal No. 90-1055
Account No. D14926

Respondent.

STATEMENT OF CASE
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission
for

a formal hearing on December 14, 1990.

Alan Hennebold,

Presiding Officer, heard the matter for and on behalf of the
Commission.
Lavar

Present

Christensen,

and representing the Petitioner
attorney.

Present

and

was F.

representing

the

Respondent was Rick Carlton, Assistant Utah Attorney General.
Following

the

hearing,

the

parties

submitted

memoranda

of

points and authority.
Based upon the evidence presented at the hearing and
the parties' memoranda, the Tax Commission hereby makes its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The tax in question is sales and use tax.

2.

The period in question is July 1, 1986 through

June 30, 1989.

ATTACHMENT 1
i\ r\ r\ 11 i\ ^ .#-*

Appeal No. 90-10
3.

Petitioner operates an indoor entertainment mall

known as the "49th Street

Galleria", which

includes

arcade

games, video machines, bowling alley, miniature golf course,
amusement

rides, roller

skating

cages, and food concessions.

rink, batting

and

pitching

Petitioner also operated a "laser

chase4' game which has since been discontinued.
4.

Respondent audited Petitioner for compliance with

Utah's Sales and Use Tax Act during the period

in question.

Based upon that audit, Respondent assessed additional sales tax
on

Petitioner's

receipts

from

its batting

cages,

amusement

rides, roller skating rink, laser chase game and food sales.
Additional sales tax was also assessed on Petitioner's receipt
of rental fees for bowling shoes and roller skates.
5.

The audit also reviewed Petitioner's purchases of

taxable

equipment

and

consumable

goods

during

the

audit

period.

Because complete records had not been maintained by

the Petitioner, 1987 was accepted by Petitioner and Respondent
as a "test year", with the results applied to the remainder of
the audit period.
6.
assessed

The

under

$20,925.64

amount
the

arises

of

audit
from

additional

was

taxable

sales

$59,675.36.
purchases

Of
of

consumable goods upon which no use tax was paid.

and
that

use

tax

amount,

equipment

and

The remainder

arises from untaxed receipts for "admissions", rental fees, and
food.
7.

Respondent audit also assessed interest and a 10%

negligence penalty of $5,967.53 against Petitioner.
-2-
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8.
and

skate

subject

Petitioner
rentals,

to sales

concedes that

amusement

tax.

rides

its
and

receipts
food

Petitioner disputes

from

shoe

purchases

are

the taxability of

receipts from its batting cages, roller skating rink and laser
game.
9.

Petitioner's

batting

cages

consist

of

fenced

areas containing a machine that pitches baseballs to customers
standing in the cage.

The machine is operated either by tokens

or by cash payments to an attendant.
10.

Petitioner's

roller

skating

rink

is

used

by

customers upon payment of a cash fee.
11.

Petitioner's laser chase game was installed some

time after

the Galleria began doing business.

during

audit

the

period, but discontinued

It was in use

thereafter.

Upon

payment of a cash fee, customers were provided laser guns and
sensing devices and engaged in mock combat in an enclosed area.
12.
Auditing

At

Petitioner's

Division

early 1984

reviewed

and advised

request,

the

Galleria1s

Petitioner that

cages and roller skating were subject
the

laser

game

was

not

yet

Kenneth

in use,

Cook

operations

of

the

during

receipts from batting
to

sales tax.

Mr. Cook

Because

expressed

no

opinion on the taxability of receipts from that game.
13.
and received

Thereafter, on August 2, 1984, Petitioner
a written

opinion

from

George

sought

Loertscher,

also

with the Auditing Division, advising Petitioner that receipts
from batting cages and roller skating were not taxable.

As the

laser game had not yet been installed, Mr- Loertscher' s written
-3-

0000001fi

Appeal No. 90-10r

opinion did not comment on the taxability of receipts from that
source.
14.
Petitioner
batting

On

the

did not

cages

basis

collect

and

roller

of
sales

Mr.
tax

skating

Loertscher's
on

receipts

rink.

collect sales tax on receipts from its

letter.

Nor

did

laser game

from

its

Petitioner
after

that

game was installed.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Utah Sales
the

amount

paid

amusement,
tables

or

and

charged

entertainment,

reserved

or

or

Use Tax Act imposes sales tax on
for

"admission

recreation,

otherwise,

to

any

place

including

and

seats

other

of
and

similar

accommodations." [Utah Code Ann. §59-12-103(f)].
"Admission" means the right or privilege to enter into
a place.

It includes the amount paid for the right to use a

reserved seat or any seat

in an auditorium, theatre, circus,

stadium,

schocihouse, meeting house, or gymnasium to view any

type

entertainment.

of

Admission

also

includes the

right to

use a table an a night club, hotel, or roof garden whether such
charge is designated as a cover charge, minimum charge, or any
such similar charge.

(Utah State Tax Commission Administrative

Rule R865-19-33S. )
"Place of amusement, entertainment
broad

in meaning, but conveys

location.
subject

to

The amount paid
sales

tax,

even

the basic

for admission
though

such

or recreation"

idea

of

a

is

definite

to such a place is
charge

includes

the

right of the purchaser to participate in some activity within
the place.

For example, the sale of a ticket for a ride upon a
-4-
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mechanical or self operated device is an admission to a place
of

amusement.

skating
tax.

Charges

for

admissions

to

swimming

rinks, and other places of amusement

Charges

to

property.

subject

to

for towel rentals, swimming suit rentals, skate

rentals, etc are also subject to tax.
subject

are

pools,

sales

tax

if

(Utah

State

the
Tax

Locker rental fees are

lockers

are

Commission

tangible

personal

Administrative

Rule

R865-19-85S.)
Every
otherwise

person

consuming

doing

business

tangible

or

personal

storing,

property

using,

in Utah

or
must

keep and preserve complete records necessary to determine

the

amount of sales and use tax for which such person is liable.
(Utah State Tax Commission Administrative Rule R865-19-22S.)
The penalty
of the underpayment.

for negligent underpayment of tax is 10%
[Utah Code Ann. §59-1-401(3)3
DECISION AND ORDER

Respondent's audit assessed Petitioner with additional
sales and use tax totalling $59,675.36 for the period July 1,
1986 through June 30, 1989.
the

tax

assessed

goods, nor does

on

The Petitioner

purchases

of

does not

equipment

and

it contest the tax assessed on

from shoe and skate

rentals, amusement

contest

consumable

its

receipts

rides and food sales.

Thus, the only issues before the Commission are the taxability
of Petitioner's
rink

receipts

and batting

cages,

from

its laser game, roller

and

the

imposition

of

skating

penalty

and

interest.
The

Commission's

Rule

R865-19-34S

specifically

-5-
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provides that "charges _for admissions to . . . skating rinks .
. are subject to tax."

There is no basis for interpreting

the rule's use of the term" "skating rinks" as applying to ice
skating rinks only.

The Commission concludes that Petitioner's

receipts from its roller skating rink are subject to sales tax.
Regarding

receipts

from

batting

cages,

Petitioner

contends it does not charge for admission to the cage, but only
for use of the pitching machine.

However, the batting cages

and pitching machines are an integrated system, one dependent
upon the other.

Use of the pitching machine is not feasible

outside the enclosed area of the batting cage, and the cage
serves no purpose without the pitching machine.

The Commission

therefore concludes that receipts from the batting cages are
payment for "admissions" and subject to sales tax.
The same

is true regarding Petitioner's laser game.

It took place in an

enclosed

area with

participants

specialized equipment provided by the Galleria.

using

Consequently,

receipts from the laser game are also subject to sales tax.
In summary, the Commission finds that receipts from
Petitioner's batting cages, roller skating and laser game are
charges for admissions within the meaning of Utah's Sales and
Use Tax Act.

However, the Commission must consider the effect

of Petitioner's reliance upon contrary advice previously given
by Auditing Division staff.
During

1984, Petitioner was advised by an Auditing

Division representative that receipts from
and

roller

skating rink were subject to

the batting cages
sales tax.

A few

0000U021
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months later, a second Auditing Division representative advised
Petitioner
roller

by

letter

that

receipts

skating were not taxable.

from

After

batting

cages

receiving

and

the second

opinion, Petitioner did not collect sales tax on receipts from
those two activities.

No opinion was ever provided

regarding

the taxability of receipts from the laser game, which had not
yet been installed.
Under
Commission

will

transactions
Petitioner
staff.

the

unusual

not

apply

in question.

for

circumstances
sales
To

tax

impose

of

this

case,

retroactively
the

its reliance on advice

to

the
the

tax would

penalize

from Auditing

Division

Furthermore, the Petitioner would be unable to recoup

the tax from its customers, who were originally responsible for
payment.

The

Commission

therefore

holds

that

Petitioner's

receipts from its batting cages and roller skating rink are nor
subject

to sales

Petitioner

did

tax

not

for the period of the audit.

rely

collect sales tax on

en Commission

laser

advice

game receipts.

in

However,

failing

to

The Petitioner

is

therefore held liable for payment of tax on those receipts.
The
penalty

against

assessment
skating

last

of

rink,

issue

requiring

Petitioner.

tax

on

penalty

must also be removed.

As

receipts
and

decision
this

from

interest

is

imposition

of

removes

the

cages

and

decision
the

based

batting

on such assessment

However, the Commission finds no basis

for waiving the 10% negligence penalty from those portions of
the audit which this decision affirms.
-7-
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This matter is remanded to Respondent for the purpose
of removing from the audit the assessment of sales tax, penalty
and

interest

attributable to Petitioner's

receipts from its

roller skating and batting cage activities.
the audit

The remainder of

is affirmed, including assessment of sales tax on

Petitioner's receipts from its laser game.

The Commission also

affirms imposition of a 10% negligence penalty and interest on
the amount of the amended audit.
Petitioner

is instructed to collect and remit sales

tax on all activities
audit,
skating.

including

identified as taxable in Respondent's

receipts

from

batting

cages

and

roller

If Petitioner has collected any sales tax on such

activities prior to this decision, such sales tax collections
must also be remitted to the Commission.
DATED this

.<j(

It is so ordered.

day of / ^ ^ A ^ ,_. 1991.

BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION.

'R. H. Hansen
Chairman

Roger O. Tew
Commissioner

/

Maun KMM^
>e B. Pacheco
Commissioner

/

S. Blaine Willes*
Commissioner

NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of the final
order to file a request for reconsideration or thirty (30) days
after the date of final order to file in Supreme.. Court a
petition for judicial review.
Utah Code Ann. §S63-46b-13(1) ,
63-46b-14(2)(a).
' ; pav^
*Since the hearing on this case, Commissioner G. Blaine ^Dav^is
has been replaced by S. Blaine Willes. Commissioner Willed Ji^s
been duly advised of the facts and circumstances regarding* th/is
case, and is qualified to sign this decision.
/ ^J;
ALH/2483W
/'»^\^V
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing
Decision to the following:
49th Street Galleria
c/o LaVar Christensen
4998 South 360 West
Salt Lake City, UT
84123
Craig Sandberg
Assistant Director, Auditing
Heber M. Wells Building
Salt Lake City, UT
84134
James H. Rogers
Director, Auditing Div.
Heber M. Wells Bldg.
Salt Lake City, UT
84134
Rick Carlton
Assistant Attorney General
36 South State, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT
84111
DATED this

J)

/^j*?<?r?/iSs\

day of

1991
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION
THE 49TH STREET GALLERIA,
ORDER

Petitioner,
v*
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AUDITING DIVISION OF THE
UTAH ST\TE TAX COMMISSION,

Account No. D14926
Respondent•

STATEMENT OF CASE
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission
upon a Petition for Reconsideration, daced December 10, 1991, filed
by the Petitioner as a result of the Commission's final decision
dated November 20, 1991.
FINDINGS
1.
a

Petition

Utah Administrative Rule R861-1-5A(P) provides that
for

Reconsideration

"will

allege

as

grounds

for

reconsideration either a mistake in law or fact, or the discovery
of new evidence."

Under this ruie, the Tax Commission may exercise

its

in

discretion

Reconsideration.
Reconsideration

granting

or

denying

a

Petition

for

The points raised in Petitioner's Petition for
are

discussed

below,

in

the

order

of

their

presentation•
2.

Petitioner argues that because it was advised by

Audit Division staff that several of its other activities were not
subject to sales tax, Petitioner was justified in concluding that

00000042
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its laser chase game was also not taxable.

Petitioner's argument

overlooks the fact that it had <*lso been advised by others on the
Audit Division staff that its activities were subject to sales tax.
Petitioner

chose to accept the advice to its liking and reject the

contrary advice.

Then, without further discussion of the matter

with Audit Division staff, Petitioner concluded that the laser
chase game was also not subject to tax.
not

existed

when

Audit

Division

The laser chase game had

staff

initially

reviewed

Petitioner's operation.
In its previous Order, the Commission waived retroactive
application

of

sales

tax

to

those

specific

activities

where

Petitioner received conflicting advice from different members of
Audit

Division

staff.

Petitioner did not receive

conflicting

advice regarding the taxability of the laser chase game.

The

Commission therefore reaffirms its decision that the laser chase
game is subject to sales tax.
3.

Petitioner also contends the Commission did

not

respond to its challenge to the administration rules under which
sales tax was

imposed on Petitioner's various activities.

effect, Petitioner

In

argues that such rules exceed the scope of

Utah's Sales Tax Act.

The Commission recognizes that payment of

sales tax cannot be required other than as authorized by the Sales
Tax Act.

However, the Commission is authorized to prescribe rules

in conformity with the Act to ascertain and assess the tax imposed
~2-
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by the Act.

(See Utah Code Ann. §59-12-118.)

The rules upon which

the assessment was made in this case are an application of the
foregoing rulemaking authority. The rules themselves have remained
unchanged for many years, with no legislative direction to the
contrary.

The Commission therefore finds no merit: in Petition's

challenge to those rules.
4.

Petitioner contends that §59-12-103(1)(f) of the

Sales Tax Act and the administrative rules pertaining to that
portion of the Act are unconstitutionally vague.

Petitioner has

framed its objections in conclusionary language, with no citation
of

authority

rejects

and minima]

Petition's

analysis.

challenge

-co the

The Commission

therefore

constitutionality

of

the

statute and rules.
5. Petitioner further a3:gues that no logical distinction
can be drawn between bowling, which is not subject to sales tax,
and batting
recognizes

cages, which are subject to tax.
that

distinctions

difficult to draw.

between

the

two

The Commission
activities

are

The exemption of bowling from sales tax is

largely historical and perhaps would not exist if a fresh look at
the issue were possible.

Even so, the fact that receipts from

bowling may have been excluded from taxation for historical reasons
does not require that receipts from batting cages also be excluded,
where such receipts are otherwise subject to sales tax under the
Sales Tax Act.
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6.

The Petitioner also contends that it has overpaid

other sales taxes and is therefore entitled to an offset against
the sales tax liability imposed by the audit which is the subject
of this appeal.

The Petitioner did not pursue such a position

during the hearing in this matter, nor has any specific claim for
refund been submitted.

Petitioner may claim such a refund in the

manner provided by law and regulation.
1.

Finally, the Commission must correct Petitioner's

misstatements regarding a draft informal opinion prepared during
1985 by an Assistant Utah Attorney General.

Petitioner contends

the Commission concealed the opinion because it was favorable to
Petitioner's position.

First, the so called opinion is merely a

draft that was never signed, never approved by the Attorney General
and never accepted by the Commission.
made no effort to conceal the draft.

Second, the Commission has
The Petitioner has a copy of

the draft, which has been made a part of the record in this matter.
The draft is not binding on the Commission, and the Commission has
rejected its conclusions for the reasons stated in the Commission's
original decision.
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DECISION AND ORDER
Based upon the foregoingf it is the decision and order of
the Utah State Tax Commission thcit the Petition for Reconsideration
is denied.

It is so ordered,

DATED this

1

JO') / day of

~7

6&L

,

1992

DER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION

>e B. Pacheco
Commissioner

/

S- Blaine Willes
Commissioner

NOTICE: You have thirty (30) days after the date of final order to
file in Supreme Court a petition for judicial review. Utah Code
Ann. §§63-46b-13(l), 63-46b-14( 2) (a) .
.-^'V/7^-.
Ah/sd/90- 1C55.ord
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing
Decision to the following:
49th Street Galleria
c/o LaVar Christensen
4998 South 360 West
Salt Lake City, UT 84123
Craig Sandberg
Assistant Director, Auditing
Heber M. Wel3s Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84134
James H. Rogers
Director, A\iditing Div.
Heber M. Wells Bldg.
Salt Lake City, UT 84134
Rick Carlton
Assistant Attorney General
36 South State, 11th FloorSalt Lake City, UT 84111
DATED this

/{/

day of

S^/fS^A

/ 1992

g ^ L ^ ^ ^ r ^ .

Secreta

-6-

00000047

